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SUBROGATION, INDEMNITY, CONTRIBUTION AND ELECTION
OF REMEDIES ASPECTS OF THE TORT CLAIMS ACT
FRED BLANTON*
Dramatically altering the concept of sovereign responsibility in the
field of injuries to person and property, the Federal Tort Claims Act of
1946 in action has progressed steadily by application and interpreta-
tion to emerge as one of the most, if not the most, important pieces
of domestic legislation enacted during the past decade. This ascend-
ency has transpired primarily because the overwhelming majority of
courts have boldly taken a dynamic approach to the inevitable prob-
lems occurring and recurring in a day-to-day consideration of the
multitude of factual permutations and combinations presented to them
for analysis and decision under the Act. Generally the private prac-
titioner has consistently sought before the judicial forums provided
under the Act, as contrasted with the legislative forum theretofore
available, to obtain relief in a speedy and expeditious manner for the
client who has in some manner suffered a loss, directly or indirectly,
as a result of some activity of the Federal Government. But not only
is the lawyer required to prosecute claims against the Government;
he may also be retained to undertake the defense of a client who
has been charged with being responsible along with a Government
agent, servant or employee for an injury to the person or property
of a third person. Furthermore, he may represent that very agent,
servant or employee who has committed the act for which the Federal
Government may be eventually adjudicated liable. More specifically,
the practicing lawyer is vitally concerned with subrogation, indem-
nity, contribution and election of remedies as these concepts have
been developed and applied within the framework of the Tort Claims
Act. An examination of the principal cases affords an excellent op-
portunity to study and analyze the problems of the private lawyer in
these fields and to state the avenues of approach open to him and their
probability of success. Perhaps at the conclusion of such an examina-
tion, questions inherent in the title will in some small measure be
answered.
SUBROGATION
The admittedly basic equitable doctrine of subrogation has seem-
ingly been concerned more particularly in the jurisprudence of years
past with those parties who are involved in certain aspects of mort-
* Formerly member of law faculties at Dickinson School of Law, University
of Virginia, and University of Alabama. In private practice, Birmingham,
Alabama.
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gages or suretyship, and with those who pay another's debt by agree-
ment or for their own benefit.1 However, the rationale underlying the
principle, that there should be an ultimate discharge of an obliga-
tion by him who in good conscience ought to pay, is of foremost im-
portance in this modern world wherein insurance against certain
specified risks is commonplace and accepted. It would indeed be
difficult in this age of automotive transport to encounter a person who
is not familiar, through the requirements of financing companies, with
that type of policy which by its terms binds the issuing insurance
company "to pay for any direct and accidental loss or of damage to
the automobile . .. caused by the collision of the automobile with
another object or by upset of the automobile." Anyone with an equity
in his home is well aware that mortgagees require protection in similar
terms against fire damaging or destroying the security. With the uni-
versal enactment of workmen's compensation laws, owners of bus-
inesses have become cognizant of protection afforded against claims
created by the application of such laws. Many times the loss to the
automobile is caused by the careless driving of another motorist, the
house is destroyed by a fire resulting from defective wiring installed
by a repairman or the employee's injury comes about through the
negligence of a third person. Nevertheless, and as it has agreed to
do, the insurance company carrying the risk has paid to the insured
or on his behalf all or part of this loss. Most assuredly, in equity and
good conscience, the person causing such loss should not escape
responding in damages for something for which he was at fault, and
responding to the insurer who has paid the loss in order that orderly
management of modern finance will not be impaired. This doctrine of
subrogation enables the insurance company to be substituted in place
of the insured, who, in the majority of such cases, had the primary
right to institute proceedings against the person at fault. Furthermore,
many policies specifically enunciate this in language similar to the
following:
"In the event of any payment under this policy, the company shall be
subrogated to all rights of recovery therefor against any person or organi-
zation. The insured and other payees, if any, shall execute and deliver
instruments and papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such
rights, and shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights."
Notwithstanding such clauses, it must be emphasized that the equitable
right of subrogation inures to the insurer upon payment without any
formal assignment or any express stipulation to that effect in the
policy.




Lawyers commencing civil actions based on subrogation claims
against the United States founded on the Tort Claims Act have been
confronted in the past with two main arguments advanced on behalf
of the Government. One concerned whether there was in fact a claim
falling within the correct interpretation of Section 1346 (b) ;2 the other,
whether there existed a direct prohibition by another, earlier and
controlling statute invalidating the assignment which is inherent in
subrogation. By Section 1346 (b), the several United States District
Courts are invested with exclusive jurisdiction "of civil actions on
claims... for money damages ... for injury or loss of property...."
Is there a "claim" within the context of this jurisdictional grant so
that an insurance company which has reimbursed its insured, or paid
money on his behalf, either in full or in part for the loss sustained,
can maintain to a conclusion an action against the Federal Government?
The Federal Anti-Assignment Act 3 forbids the assignment of claims
against the United States. Is this subrogation assignment within the
terms of this Act?
It is essential at this point to review the problem which faced the
Congress in waiving sovereign immunity. A succinct statement, and
one outlining the solution, is found in State of Maryland, to Use of
Burkhardt v. United States:
"Congress was creating a liability not theretofore existing on the part of
the government. To have defined all of the tort rules under which lia-
bility could be established would have been an almost impossible under-
taking; but standards of liability were necessary and Congress was com-
pelled, as a practical matter, to adopt the principles of local law in
defining them."4
Turning now to the earlier cases on subrogation in the courts of
appeal, Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United States,5 concerned itself with
fire insurance companies which had paid a part of the loss caused by
the crash of a United States airplane and the resultant fire. The owner
of the property which was damaged had originated the action in the
district court and the companies sought intervention, which was
initially denied. However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
stated in part:
"We are persuaded that a proper interpretation of 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 931
[now 1346(b)] permits the institution of an action against the United
States and the right to intervene in a pending action by a subrogee.
"Appellant subrogees are claimants whose claims exist 'on account of'
damage to property."6
2. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (1950).
3. REV. STAT. § 3477 (1875), as amended, 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 203 et seq. (1927).
4. 165 F.2d 869, 871 (4th Cir. 1947).
5. 167 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1948).
6. Id. at 656.
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The importance of and dependence on local law in determining lia-
bility under the Tort Claims Act, and particularly the existence of
the right of subrogation is well illustrated by Old Colony Ins. Co. v.
United States,7 and National American Fire Ins. Co. of Omaha v.
United States.8 In the former case the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that the company which had reimbursed the owner of an
automobile for a loss sustained when his property was damaged by
an army truck was subrogated in accordance with Ohio law, which
was said to be conclusive of the question. In the latter case, a house
was damaged by an airplane of the United States and the insurance
company paid the owner the loss sustained thereby, and the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated the claim arose by operation of
California law. The Old Colony case pointed out that the subrogation
right was one enforced to achieve substantial justice, and the "claim"
of the Tort Claims Act was not limited to that in favor of one who
had actually suffered damage to his property. Further, there was a
recognition that the right arises by operation of law and not as a
result of an assignment within the ban of the Anti-Assignment Act.
The National American Fire Ins. Co. case was more emphatic in de-
claring that an assignment of the claim was an idle act and had no
legal significance, insofar as third parties were concerned. Of interest
was the court's presenting, without deciding, the questions of whether
several insurers should be joined and whether the possibility of setoff
and counterclaim by the Government resulted in a disadvantage of
inconvenience not in harmony with the purposes of the Act.
Augusta Broadcasting Co. v. United States,9 considered a somewhat
different aspect of the subrogation question. In that case, a radio
tower of the plaintiff had been demolished by a Navy aircraft.
National Union Insurance Company paid plaintiff $3,634.05, which
was denominated as a loan, repayable only to the extent of the re-
covery which plaintiff could obtain from any third person. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was not concerned and did not
elaborate on the right of the subrogee to sue, holding merely that the
giving of the loan receipt did not affect the right of the plaintiff to
sue and that it was the real party in interest.
Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. United States,0 developed other facets of the
subrogation problem. There two insurance companies each paid part
of the loss and separate actions were brought. The Government con-
tended that there existed a serious inconvenience to it if partial sub-
rogees could sue. The court answered by pointing out that such in-
convenience could be avoided by a timely objection (which could be
7. 168 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1948).
8. 171 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1948).
9. 170 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1948).
10. 171 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1948).
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waived). Furthermore, Rule 17 (a)," clearly allows suits by the real
party in interest. Quoting from Williston, the court supported its
position:
"At an early day an assignee of a chose in action was permitted to
sue in the assignor's name and later was permitted to sue in his own name
under real party in interest statutes. But when there were several
partial assignees the rule forbidding splitting causes of action prevented
them from suing individually. All could join or be joined in an action
as parties plaintiff, or the partial assignee could separately intervene in an
action by an assignor."12
One court of appeals held, with a vigorous dissent, in United States
v. Hill,13 that the Federal Anti-Assignment Act was applicable and
denied a claim instituted by a subrogated insurance company.
In United States v. South Carolina State Highway Department,14
where several insurance companies paid for a loss to a bridge, the
court left open one question and resolved another previously men-
tioned:
"Some question might arise in a proper case as to the right of an insurer
who had paid only a part of the loss to maintain an independent action
for the recovery of the amount paid; for this would involve the splitting of
a cause of action."15
"So far as the right of setoff and counterclaim is concerned, the right of
the subrogee to recover cannot rise above those to whose rights he has
been subrogated."16
Furthermore, the court stated it was no hardship for the Government
to sue in another suit where its counterclaim exceeded the amount of
the claim.
The partial subrogee question was also posed and answered in State
Farm Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. United States, in the First
Circuit:
"We think that a partial subrogee is a real party in interest, under Rule
17(a), and as such has standing to sue in his own name, subject only to
the right of the defendant, by making timely objection, to insist upon the
joinder of the other parties in interest in order to avoid a split-up of the
cause of action."17
11. "(a) Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest: but an executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may
sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose benefit the
action is brought; and when a statute of the United States so provides, an
action for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the
United States." FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
12. Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. United States, supra note 10, at 375.
13. 171 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1948).
14. 171 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1948).
15. Id. at 897.
16. Id. at 898.
17. 172 F.2d 737, 739 (lst Cir. 1949).
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The workmen's compensation situation developed in Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. v. United States.18 An employee of the Federal Reserve
Bank was injured through the negligence of the Post Office Depart-
ment. The insurance carrier paid on behalf of the employer the claim
for workmen's compensation. The injured employee failed to bring
an action against the responsible agency within one year of the injury
and, under New York law, this operated as an assignment of the claim
to the carrier, which thereupon instituted an action. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held that the Anti-Assignment Act did
not apply. It further stated that plaintiff's claim was founded on,
limited by and substituted for the injured employee's claim. Thus,
counterclaims arising from the same transaction could be interposed,
and that unrelated counterclaims could be the subject of a new and
different action. A main point of interest concerned venue, wherein
the assignment could result in venue in a district other than that in
which the original claimant could properly have brought the action.19
These cases, and particularly the last one, culminated in certiorari
to the Supreme Court of the United States. The writ granted, the main
issues of subrogation were presented in argument and resolved. In
clear language, the Court held in the Aetna Casualty case (1) the
insurer carrying the workmen's compensation risk had a right to sue,
(2) that a judgment could properly be rendered against the United
States in favor of an insurance company on a subrogated claim and
in favor of an individual on a personal injury claim, and (3) that
two insurance companies who had each paid part of a loss could
sue.2 0 The Court clarified its ruling by adding that where an insurance
company had paid all the loss, it must sue in its own name, following
Rule 17 (a). Further, where each had made partial payments both
were real parties in interest and could sue, subject to the right of
the United States to compel joinder under Rule 19 (b),21 since both
were necessary parties. The main issues resolved: (1) a subrogee has a
claim, and (2) the Federal Anti-Assignment Act has an implicit ex-
18. 170 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1948), af'd, 338 U.S. 366, 70 Sup. Ct. 207, 94 L. Ed.
171 (1949).
19. Id. at 472.
20. 338 U.S. 366, 70 Sup. Ct. 207, 94 L. Ed. 171 (1949).
21. "(b) Effect of Failure to Join. When persons who are not indispensable,
but who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between those
already parties, have not been made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction
of the court as to both service of process and venue and can be made parties
without depriving the court of jurisdiction of the parties before it, the court
shall order them summoned to appear in the action. The court in its discretion
may proceed in the action without making such persons parties, if its jurisdic-
tion over them as to either service of process or venue can be acquired only
by their consent or voluntary appearance or if, though they are subject to its
jurisdiction, their joinder would deprive the court of jurisdiction of the parties
before it; but the judgment rendered therein does not affect the rights or lia-
bilities of absent persons." FED R. CIrv. P. 19 (b).
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ception recognized through the years in favor of an assignment by
operation of law.
The practical operation of this decision is illustrated by United
States v. State Road Department of Florida,22 where an insurance
company which had paid part of the damages to a bridge was com-
pelled to join in the action.
One unresolved problem in subrogation-that of inability to compel
joinder for lack of proper venue2 3- would appear to offer no insur-
mountable legal or practical problems. As mentioned in the Aetna
Casualty case, the subrogee may have a residence in a district other
than that of the primary claimant. Certainly no greater handicap
exists against the Government in this situation than in one where the
suing claimant resides elsewhere than where the tort occurred. Fur-
thermore, the Government has its rights under Section 1404(a):
"(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other dis-
trict or division where it might have been brought"24
CONTRIBUTION AD INDEMMNTY
Taking the considered risk of oversimplification, working definitions
of contribution and indemnity for use in connection with the Tort
Claims Act must be presented. The quasi-contractual right of indem-
nity arises when a person who, without fault on his part, has been
compelled to pay damages occasioned by the primary negligence of
another, whether or not contractual relations exist between them. On
the other hand, there is a common-law inhibition against enforcement
in the courts of contribution among parties whose common burden
arises from participation in a tort. To the extent that this has been
modified by statute or otherwise, such modification is based upon
those concepts of equity and natural justice which require that those
who have a common burden should bear it in equal proportions and
one party should not bear more than his just share to the advantage
of the others. No attempt is made here to survey the law of each state
to determine whether such rights exist. The lawyer is cautioned that
the rules of his own jurisdiction control. For instance, the right of
contribution does not exist under New York law in the absence of a
joint judgment against the tortfeasors,2 while in Pennsylvania such
22. 189 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1951).
23. Tort claims "may be prosecuted only in the judicial district where the
plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred." 28
U.S.C.A. § 1402 (b) (1950).
24. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (1950).
25. Wasserman v. Perugini, 173 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1949).
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a judgment is not required.26 Whatever mention is made of local law
serves only to illustrate the workings of the Tort Claims Act.
A comparison of two cases will develop the difference between sub-
rogation and indemnity. In the Aetna Casualty case, the insurance
carrier paid on behalf of the insured compensation to an injured em-
ployee and was subrogated, by operation of law, to the primary claim
of such injured employee. In United States v. Chicago, R. L & P. Ry., 2 7
a railway employee was injured and made a claim against his employer
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act28 for compensation, which
claim the employer settled. Although the court said that either
as a subrogee or indemnitee the railroad could maintain an action
against the responsible third party, it seems clear that this is the
right of indemnity as defined.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. United States,29 points out the dif-
ference between indemnity and contribution. There the plaintiff
railroad paid certain claims of employees for damages caused by
inhalation and contact with gas from poisonous gas bombs shipped by
the United States and carried by plaintiff over its lines. The plaintiff
averred specially that it was without fault. Applying Mississippi
law, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said that a right of
indemnity, as distinguished from a right of contribution, arises in
favor of one not actively at fault as against an active wrongdoer.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,30 resolved
all doubts as to the liability of the United States on claims for con-
tribution, and presumably for indemnity, where the local law so pro-
vides. Notwithstanding such a clear exposition and interpretation of
the Tort Claims Act, the impact of jurisdictional and procedural limita-
tions in the federal courts has caused some dilemmas, which have been
complicated further by varying rules of local law.
Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States,3' represents an attempt which
failed to solve a perennial problem. The case arose out of the South
Amboy explosion. In these disaster cases, some corporation or corpora-
tions are likely to be subjected to many damage suits. As a practical
matter, there exists no forum in today's jurisprudence wherein the
question of liability can be decided. Plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment to determine whether plaintiff, seven primary defendants,
the United States or others were guilty of the negligence which caused
the explosion. More specifically, plaintiff sought a judgment declaring
26. Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., 181 F.2d 967 (3d Cir. 1950), ar'd sub noma.,
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 71 Sup. Ct. 399, 95 L. Ed. 523
(1951)
27. 171 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1948).
28. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51 et seq. (1939).
29. 187 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1951).
30. 340 U.S. 543, 71 Sup. Ct. 399, 95 L. Ed. 523 (1951).
31. 111 F. Supp. 80 (D.N.J. 1953).
1954]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
whether plaintiff, any of the claimants or defendants were entitled to
judgments, contribution or indemnity from the United States or any
other defendant.
Significantly, the court said a declaratory judgment action could
be instituted against the United States to determine liability under
the Tort Claims Act, despite strenuous objection by the Government
that only actions for money damages are allowable. However, all
was to no avail, since the district court dismissed the action because
all the parties were not in the suit and could not be brought in due to
the geographical limits of service of process and therefore the matter
could not be concluded. Even if Congress extended the limits of
service of process in these disaster cases, jurisdictional limitations
might defeat the cause because of a lack of diversity.
Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. United States, 2 and Terminal R.R.
Ass'n of St. Louis v. United States,33 concerned claims for indemnity
under the Tort Claims Act and involved the statute of limitations
which was formerly one year, but is now two years. 4 The problem is
when does the indemnity claim arise. Moore states:
"If the defendant has a claim over against a third-party defendant -such
as a claim for indemnity, contribution, etc. - the statute usually will not
commence to run against the defendant (third-party plaintiff) and in
favor of the third-party defendant until judgment has been entered against
the defendant, or the defendant has paid the judgment."35
In the Terminal case, plaintiff was compelled to pay on April 2,
1948, a claim for an accident which happened on June 10, 1943, prior
to the time stated in the Act, January 1, 1945, when claims first came
under the Act. The civil action for indemnity against the United States
was filed on February 16, 1949. The court held that in 1943 the United
States had no obligation to the injured employee whom the Terminal
Company discharged. In the Ryan case, the plaintiff sought indemnity
against the United States for damage which occurred on August 11,
1944. The Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit reached the same
result as that reached by the court in the Terminal case, but for a dif-
ferent reason. The court said a later accruing claim for indemnity
because of an earlier tort would seem not freed from the bar of the
statute of limitations, even though it apparently recognized that
normally a claim for indemnity does not arise until payment by the
person secondarily liable. The conclusion reached seems reasonable.
32. 175 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1949).
33. 182 F.2d 149 (8th Cir. 1950).
34. "(b) A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless
action is begun thereon within two years after such claim accrues, or within
one year after the date of enactment of this amendatory sentence, whichever
is later. ... " 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401(b) (1950).
35. 3 MooaR, FEnDamA PRAcricz § 14.09 (2d ed. 1948).
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Derivative rights allowed under the Tort Claims Act should not rise
higher than the primary ones. Otherwise, the government may be
seriously inconvenienced.
A person entitled to indemnity or contribution against the United
States may find himself blocked if sued in the state courts, and no
other grounds for removal exist. In McCracken v. Brown & Root, Inc.,36
defendant was sued in the state court for dynamite blast damages
and sought to remove to the district court on the ground that the
United States was liable under the Tort Claims Act. Since jurisdiction
is exclusive in the federal courts, the United States could not have been
sued in the state courts. Since there could have been no jurisdiction
in the state court, no right of removal existed.
A problem seemingly destined for ultimate decision by the Supreme
Court of the United States involves the right of indemnity in favor of
the United States as contrasted with the right against the Government.
In the master-servant relationship it is axiomatic that a master who
has had to respond in damages through application of the doctrine of
respondeat superior is entitled to be indemnified by the servant.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Gilman v. United
States, 37 has resolved the matter in favor of the erring employee.
Burks v. United States,37a held otherwise.
In the Gilman case the employee urged that Section 2676 of the
Judicial Code38 revealed the intention of Congress to give the govern-
ment employee certain benefits and such expressed intention negated
any indemnity in such circumstances in favor of the United States.
The quasi-contractual nature of indemnity, that the payment by the
employer confers a benefit upon the employee which should be paid
since otherwise he would be unjustly enriched, afforded the basis for
the holding. The court stated that by virtue of Section 2676, when
judgment was entered against the United States the employee was no
longer primarily liable; in fact, his liability was completely ex-
tinguished. A payment then by the Government actually conferred
no benefit on the employee to result in unjust enrichment. United
States v. Standard Oil Co.,39 which made it clear that the government-
employee relationship was one controlled by federal rather than
state law, and that there was no action in existence whereby the Gov-
ernment could seek reimbursement on account of injuries suffered by
36. 101 F. Supp. 180 (W.D. Ark. 1951).
37. 206 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1953), 7 VAND. L. REV. 286 (1954).
37a. 116 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1953).
38. "The judgment in an action under section 1346 (b) of this title shall con-
stitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same sub-
ject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave
rise to the claim." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2676 (1950).
39. 332 U.S. 301, 67 Sup. Ct. 1604, 91 L. Ed. 2067 (1947).
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a soldier at the hands of a third person, was not felt to be controlling
in view of the rationale adopted.
The dissent noted that insurance carriers may escape liability be-
cause many employees are derelict in the course of their employment
while driving privately owned vehicles fully covered by liability
insurance.
The decision in the Burks case was predicated on the theory that Sec-
tion 2676 does not concern the Government's right to indemnity in
such circumstances. The court pointed out that the Tort Claims Act
does not require that an action be maintained against the Govern-
ment alone and that a claimant may pursue the employee. Moore
states:
"We believe that the right of the United States to indemnity from its
negligent employee is a proper case. The common law has long recognized
the right of the master to be indemnified by the servant and it is no
novelty to recognize that right when the United States is claiming
against its employee." 40
It is believed that the decision of the Gilman case is eminently
correct. Prior to the Tort Claims Act the Congress enacted legislation
for the relief of individuals injured through the negligence of Govern-
ment employees. Throughout the history of this country no case has
been found wherein the United States sought to recover the amount
so expended from its employees! It must be concluded that there
has never existed a right of indemnity in favor of the United States
against its employees. The Standard Oil case makes it clear that fed-
eral law must govern this master-servant relationship. The Tort
Claims Act does not create such a course of action and the courts
should not do so in the absence of specific legislation.
ELECTION OF REMEDIES
The doctrine of election of remedies is applicable only where in-
consistent remedies are pursued to enforce the same cause. On the
contrary, where there are in existence two or more concurrent and
consistent remedies, one or all may be prosecuted until full satisfaction
is obtained.
Consideration of a common situation under the Tort Claims Act
involving election of remedies starts with Sections 2672 and 2675,
quoted here in part:
"§ 2672. Administrative adjustment of claims of $1,000 or less
"The head of each federal agency, or his designee for the purpose, acting
on behalf of the United States, may consider, ascertain, adjust, determine,
and settle any claim for money damages of $1,000 or less against the
40. 3 MoozR, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 14.29 at 514 (2d ed. 1948).
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United States accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of
property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrong-
ful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in ac-
cordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
"Subject to the provisions of this title relating to civil actions on tort
claims against the United States, any such award or determination shall
be final and conclusive on all officers of the government, except when
procured by means of fraud."
"§ 2675. Disposition by federal agency as prerequisite; evidence
"(a) An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United
States which has been presented to a federal agency, for money damages
for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the government
while acting within the scope of his authority, unless such federal agency
has made final disposition of the claim.
"(b) The claimant, however, may, upon fifteen days written notice, with-
draw such claim from consideration of the federal agency and commence
action thereon. Action under this section shall not be instituted for any
sum in excess of the amount of the claim presented to the federal agency,
except where the increased amount is based upon newly discovered evi-
dence not reasonably discoverable at the time of presenting the claim to
the federal agency, or upon allegation and proof of intervening facts,
relating to the amount of the claim.
"(c) Disposition of any claim by the Attorney General or other head of
a federal agency shall not be competent evidence of liability or amount of
damages."41
In Carson v. United States,4 claimant fell in a post office and filed a
claim for administrative determination for $2,500. Since a claim for
this amount could not be entertained by the agency, claimant reduced
to $1,000, stating such action to be without prejudice. After the claim
was rejected, a civil action was filed for $20,000. The court limited
recovery to $1,000, the amount of the claim, and considered the reserva-
tion in the reduced claim to be of no effect.
A similar situation arose in Corkle v. United States, 43 wherein claim-
ant's property was injured by a Post Office Department vehicle. A
claim was filed with the department for $1,300, later reduced to $1,000.
After administrative rejection of the claim, the court in an action
stated plaintiff could not recover over $1,000.
In Reardon v. United States,4 4 claim was filed with the Post Office
Department for $450.00, and after refusal, suit was instituted for
41. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2672, 2675 (1950).
42. 88 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
43. 94 F. Supp. 908 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
44. 87 F. Supp. 35 (D. Mass. 1949).
19541
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
$750.00. The plaintiff was allowed to amend to seek only the amount
of the original claim.
These cases should make clear that a claimant may choose to elect
the administrative remedy provided under the Act to his prejudice.
Since lawyers are forbidden to solicit business, a layman should be
informed and made cognizant of the fact that any damage to property
or injury to person at the hands of the Government should be discussed
with a lawyer in order that he may be fully advised as to his rights
under the Tort Claims Act. Otherwise, the filing of a claim and sub-
sequent refusal may seriously limit the amount of recovery.
Furthermore, the mere existence of administrative rights given by
another statute and not acted upon, would not constitute an election.
In United States v. Gaidys, where the Military Claims Act 46 was in-
volved, the court said:
"And there is no sustainable basis for the argument that the Act should be
narrowed through the process of interpretation by excluding from its
reach claims of the kind presented here merely because the plaintiffs
might have submitted their claims to administrative consideration and
action pursuant to the Military Claims Act. To narrow the Tort Claims
Act in that manner would not be in harmony with the Congressional
purpose in enacting it."46
Where federal employees, military and civilian, have been injured
by activities of the Federal Government, there has been much discussion
in the cases of election of remedies, or, in reality, whether the federal
employee was actually covered by the Act.
In Feres v. United States,47 an injury to a military person suf-
fered in line of duty was held not to be contemplated by the Tort
Claims Act because of the system of benefits otherwise provided for
compensation. However, in Parr v. United States,48 the court said
that a civilian employee of the War Department was covered by both
the Tort Claims Act and Federal Employees' Compensation Act.40 In
contrast with the person in the military, where no right existed under
the Tort Claims Act, the presentation of a monthly claim under the
Compensation Act and the acceptance of payments was held to be an
election of remedies and suit was precluded under the Tort Claims
Act.
Wham v. United States,50 concerned a plaintiff, a member of the
Metropolitan Police Force of the District of Columbia, who was in-
jured by a Treasury Department vehicle. There was in existence a
45. 42 STAT. 725 (1922), as amended, 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 223 et seq. (1927).
46. 194 F.2d 762, 764 (10th Cir. 1952).
47. 340 U.S. 135, 71 Sup. Ct. 153, 95 L. Ed. 152 (1950).
48. 172 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1949).
49. 39 STAT. 742 (1916), 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 751 et seq. (1949).
50. 180 F.2d 38 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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Police and Fireman's Relief Fund, supported by the United States.
Against the contention that plaintiff must elect the court found that
there were no inconsistent remedies to force an election.
Lewis v. United States,51 involved a U. S. Park Police member who
was allegedly shot by another member who was engaged with him in
the course of duty in pursuing two fugitives. The court pointed out
that employees covered by the Federal Employees' Compensation Act
are expressly forbidden to sue the government for injuries received
in the course of their duties.52
Although the question of coverage was not decided, the court pointed
out the availability of the same fund as existed in the Wham case.
Sasse v. United States, 3 held that the amendatory act above pre-
cluded a civilian employee of the War Assets Administration from
bringing an action under the Tort Claims Act.
The practical import then is that even though there might have been
an election in the past, there is none now so far as both civilian and
military personnel of the government are concerned when injured in
the line of duty. This has been extended to the defendant parents
of a U. S. Military Academy cadet who sued for damage for the death
of the cadet sustained in course of military duty in Archer v. United
States;54 and to those seeking damages for the death of a federal
prisoner in Sigmon v. United States.55
Canon v. United States,56 distinguished the preceding cases, which
followed the doctrine of Johansen v. United States,5 7 and declared that
a civilian employee at an army hospital who was negligently operated
on for varicose veins was not required to resort to the Federal Em-
ployees' Compensation Act rather than the Tort Claims Act. To the
same effect is Dishman v. United States,58 involving a Veterans' Ad-
ministration employee not injured in his employment. However,
51. 190 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
52. "(b) The liability of the United States or any of its instrumentalities
under sections 751-756, 757-791, and 793 of this title or any extension thereof
with respect to the injury or death of an employee shall be exclusive, and in
place, of all other liability of the United States or such instrumentality to the
employee, his legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, and anyone
otherwise entitled to recover damages from the United States or such instru-
mentality, on account of such injury or death, in any direct judicial proceedings
in a civil action or in admiralty, or by proceedings, whether administrative
or judicial, under any other workmen's compensation law or under any Federal
tort liability statute: Provided, however, That this subsection shall not apply
to a master or a member of the crew of any vessel." 63 STAT. 854, 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 757(b) (Cum. Supp. 1950).
53. 201 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1953).
54. 112 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
55. 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953).
56. Ill F. Supp. 162 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
57. 343 U.S. 427, 72 Sup. Ct. 849, 95 L. Ed. 1051 (1952).
58. 93 F. Supp. 567 (D. Md. 1950).
1954]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Pettis v. United States,5 9 held that an army nurse with a service con-
nected injury and entitled to veteran's benefits, who was later injured
through the negligence of a veterans' hospital was precluded from
suing under the Tort Claims Act. Similarly where there is a remedy
available under the Suits in Admiralty Act, as was the case in Abbat-
tisa v. United States,60 an action under the Tort Claims Act was held
to be precluded.
Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. United States, 1 can well be
the climax of this article. There property belonging to Air Force per-
sonnel was damaged by the crash of an Air Force bomber, such property
then being on the base at a trailer camp maintained for military per-
sonnel. The insurance companies involved brought subrogated claims
against the United States. The court said:
"Suits against the Government by insurers to recover for the service-
connected property losses of military personnel, are not authorized under
the present statutory scheme."
62
The plaintiffs were left without a remedy, and were advised that their
recourse was to the Congress. Thus, the compulsory election of reme-
dies enforced by the congressional scheme of compensation under the
Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945,63 resulted in the Government
escaping a liability which it should justly bear.
Apparently, only in the field of election of administrative action or
a suit under the Tort Claims Act does an election of remedies doctrine
have some significance, and then only when a private individual is
involved.
CONCLUSION
Most of the conclusions to be derived from this exposition have been
presented as the cases were pertinent. Some few comments, however,
may not be amiss as to their broad effect on administration of the Act.
Subrogation, indemnity and contribution have all been demonstrated
to be workable concepts within the structure of the Act. However,
the end result has been and will continue to be that all citizens of the
United States do not receive identical treatment in tort cases against
the Government. Thus, a right of contribution may exist in one state
and not in another. On the rule of local law will depend whether or
not a joint tortfeasor can pursue the United States. Although the Act
was conceived with admirable purpose, this and like inequities which
59. 108 F. Supp. 500 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
60. 95 F. Supp. 679 (D.N.J. 1951).
61. 111 F. Supp. 899 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
62. Id. at 906.
63. 59 STAT. 225 (1945), as amended, 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 222c, 222d, 223b (Supp.
1953).
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tend to defeat that purpose should be removed by legislation. Admitted-
ly this would be a difficult task, but one which should appeal to fair-
minded people everywhere. To exclude the benefits of subrogation,
indemnity or contribution to all would not be a suggested solution.
However, a clause in the Act setting out in essence the rights and
thereby allowing a federal body of law to emerge might be acceptable.
This could be extended to the definition of the tort, since there exist
differences in local law which might result in similar inequities in
direct actions against the Government by the one injured.
Practically, as we have seen, where compensation is provided for
the injured employee by the United States under another Act, there
has resulted a compulsory election of remedies, with the result, in one
case at least, that the Government has escaped full responsibility for
its negligence. An examination anew of the multitude of acts covering
compensation to Government employees could well be undertaken by
the Congress to resolve such difficulties.
